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Disappearing government bond spreads 
in the eurozone – Back to normal? 
Paul De Grauwe 
and Yuemei Ji* 
CEPS Working Document No. 396 / May 2014 
1. Introduction 
Since the announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme by ECB 
President Mario Draghi in 2012, the government bond spreads started a strong decline, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. By taking away the intense existential fear that the collapse of the 
eurozone was imminent, the ECB’s lender-of-last-resort commitment pacified government 
bond markets. This pacification was the start of a strong decline in the spreads of the 
eurozone countries, which has continued until today.  
The issue that arises here is how much of this decline is due to the OMT announcement and 
how much is the result of developments in the fundamentals – government debt, external 
debt, competitiveness, growth, etc. – that influence the spreads. This question is important. If 
the decline of the spreads is primarily the result of improved fundamentals, then the need 
for the OMT programme can be questioned. More generally, if the spreads are mainly driven 
by fundamentals, the ECB has no business in trying to influence these spreads as these can 
only decline with an improvement in the fundamentals.  
This is also the position taken by the German Constitutional Court. The latter declared OMT 
to be illegal and referred the case to the Court of Justice of the European Union with the 
demand that conditions be imposed on the OMT programme that would render it ineffective 
and useless. The main argument in the German judges’ ruling is that the spreads reflect 
underlying economic fundamentals. Attempts by the ECB to reduce these spreads are 
attempts to counter the view of market participants. In so doing, the ECB is in fact pursuing 
economic policy – an activity that falls outside its mandate. 
Implicit in this argument is the view that markets are efficient (see De Grauwe (2014), 
Winkler (2014) and Gerner-Beuerle et al. (2014)). The surging spreads observed from 2010 to 
the middle of 2012 were the result of deteriorating fundamentals (e.g. domestic government 
debt, external debt, competitiveness, etc.). Thus, the market was just a messenger of bad 
news. Its judgment should then be respected, also by the ECB. The implication of the 
efficient market theory is that the only way these spreads can go down is by improving the 
fundamentals, mainly via austerity programmes aimed at reducing government budget 
deficits and debts. With its OMT programme, the ECB is in fact reducing the need to 
improve these fundamentals.  
                                                   
* Paul De Grauwe is John Paulson Professor in European Political Economy at the London School of 
Economics and Associate Senior Research Fellow at CEPS. Yuemei Ji is a researcher at Brunel 
University. The authors are grateful to Daniel Gros for perceptive comments. 
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Figure 1. Spreads on 10-year government bond rates in selected eurozone countries 
 
Source: Datastream. 
 
Another theory, while accepting that fundamentals matter, recognises that collective 
movements of fear and panic can have dramatic effects on spreads. These movements can 
drive the spreads away from underlying fundamentals, very much in the way that stock 
market prices can be gripped by a bubble, pushing them far away from underlying 
fundamentals (Corsetti & Dedola (2011), De Grauwe (2011) and Gros (2011)). The implication 
of that theory is that while fundamentals cannot be ignored, there is a special role for the 
central bank to provide liquidity in times of market panic.  
This OMT decision of the ECB provides us with an interesting experiment to test these two 
theories about how spreads are formed. In De Grauwe & Ji (2013a) such a test was 
performed. The data sample, however, ended just before the OMT announcement. More data 
have now become available, allowing us to also test for the impact of OMT, which we do in 
the next section. 
2. Testing two theories of the spreads 
The spreads in the government bond rates (10-year) have been subjected to wild fluctuations 
since the start of the financial crisis in 2008. While prior to the crisis these spreads had been 
close to zero, they started to increase spectacularly from 2010 on. In De Grauwe & Ji (2013a) 
we showed that this spectacular increase can be associated with deteriorating fundamentals 
only in a limited extent, and that most of the surge is due to strongly negative market 
sentiments. Since 2012 Q3, the spreads have started to decline spectacularly (see Figure 1). 
Our econometric analysis aims at determining how much of the decline is due to improving 
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fundamentals and how much should be attributed to positive market sentiments triggered 
by the announcement of OMT in the third quarter of 2012. 
We specify an econometric model of the spreads, relying on the existing literature to do so.1 
The most common fundamental variables found in this literature are variables measuring the 
sustainability of government debt. We will use the debt-to-GDP ratio as a measure of 
sustainability. In addition, we use the current account position, the real effective exchange 
rate and the rate of economic growth as fundamental variables affecting the spreads. We 
then add to this fundamental model of the spreads an index of market sentiments. We obtain 
the latter by introducing time dummies in the model that are independent from the 
fundamental variables. We show the detail of this model (including the estimation results) in 
the Appendix. Here we discuss the results that relate to the relative importance of the 
fundamentals and the market sentiment index.  
Figure 2. Time components of spreads in the eurozone (2000 Q1-2013 Q4) 
 
Source: Calculations based on regression equation (for details, see the Appendix). 
 
We plot the time dummies obtained from the econometric model in Figure 2. We have split 
the countries into two groups: the core and the periphery countries of the eurozone. We find 
very strong time dummies for the countries in the latter group, which suggests that 
“departures” occurred in the spreads especially in the periphery. That is, during 2010-12, 
these countries experienced a marked increase in their spreads that cannot be accounted for 
by fundamental developments, in particular by the changes in the debt-to-GDP ratios. 
                                                   
1 See Attinasi et al. (2009), Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2010), Schuknecht et al. (2010), Caceres et al. 
(2010), Aizenman & Hutchinson (2012) and Beirne & Fratzscher (2012). There is of course a vast 
literature on the spreads in the government bond markets in general. See for example the classic 
Eaton, Gersovitz & Stiglitz (1986) and Eichengreen & Mody (2000). Much of this literature has been 
influenced by the debt problems of emerging economies. See, for example, Edwards (1984), and Min 
(1999). 
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Similarly, since 2012 (Q3), the spreads have further declined significantly. This decline 
cannot be associated with changes in fundamentals but rather are again due to changing 
market sentiments, this time in a positive direction. This change coincides exactly with the 
announcement of OMT by the ECB.  
Given the fact that the time dummies reached negative territory in 2013, one may raise the 
question of whether the market has become too optimistic about the periphery, in a similar 
way as it was prior to the start of the crisis. During that period the time dummies were 
negative, suggesting that according to the fundamentals the spreads of the periphery 
countries should have been higher. Optimism (euphoria), however, prevailed then and 
prevented the markets from seeing the risks. Our results suggest that the same phenomenon 
may have been happening since 2013.   
These observations suggest that since 2010 the markets were first gripped by negative 
sentiments and tended to exaggerate the default risks of individual countries, i.e. they 
pushed the spreads way above the fundamental risks. Since the announcement of OMT, the 
reverse has happened: the spreads went down spectacularly, mostly driven by positive 
market sentiments unrelated to the improvements (if any) in the fundamentals.  
In order to find out the relative importance of the fundamental variables and the market 
sentiments (as measured by the time dummies) in influencing the spreads, we computed the 
quantitative importance of these two factors in explaining the predicted spreads in the 
model. We analyse two periods, the first of which runs from 2008 Q1 to 2012 Q2. This is the 
period of the build-up of the sovereign debt crisis. The second period goes from 2012 Q3 to 
2013 Q4, just following the OMT announcement that triggered the decline in the spreads. We 
show the results in Figures 3 (first period) and 4 (second period).  
Concentrating on Figure 3, we find that the largest part of the surge in the spreads during 
2008-12 is due to negative market sentiments that were unrelated to the fundamentals (the 
time dummies). Nevertheless, the fundamentals play some role in explaining the surge in the 
spreads in the case of Greece and to a lesser extent in Portugal.  
Things are very different during the second, post-OMT period (Figure 4). We find that the 
sharp decline of the spreads since OMT is totally dissociated from changes in fundamentals. 
The latter play no role at all in explaining this decline in the spreads. This result strongly 
suggests that the ECB’s OMT announcement was quite effective in turning around market 
sentiments. These became very positive and corrected for the excessive pessimism that 
existed before the announcement. These results also suggest that the view that countries can 
be pushed into bad equilibria in a self-fulfilling way is the right one. This view provides the 
major justification for a role of the central bank as lender of last resort. It is particularly 
worrisome that this role is being questioned by the German Constitutional Court’s ruling of 
February 2014, and that this ruling is based on a theory that is rejected by the data.  
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Figure 3. Contribution of fundamentals and time dummies in predicted change in spreads  
(2008Q1-2012Q2) 
 
Figure 4. Contribution of fundamentals and time dummies in predicted change in spreads  
(2012Q1-2013Q4) 
 
Source: Calculations based on regression equation (1). 
 
Note that our results in spirit are consistent with the well-known findings of Robert Shiller, 
who detected that the large variability of stock prices cannot be accounted for by the 
variability of dividends (Shiller, 1981). 
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3. Completing the monetary union with political union 
The institutional set-up that has been created in the eurozone is not sustainable and will have 
to be completed with steps towards a fiscal union. The latter implies a degree of political 
union that goes much farther than what has been achieved so far. Let us develop these points 
further. 
The present institutional set-up of the eurozone is characterised by the fact that a number of 
bureaucratic institutions have acquired significant responsibilities without political 
accountability. Thus, there has been a transfer of sovereignty without a concomitant 
democratic legitimacy.  
The European Central Bank’s power has increased significantly as a result of the sovereign 
debt crisis. With the announcement of the OMT programme and given the success of this 
programme it has become clear (at least outside Germany) that the ECB is the ultimate 
guarantor of sovereign debt in the eurozone. In this sense the ECB has become a central bank 
like the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. There is one important difference, 
however. In the US and the UK, the government exercises control over the central bank, i.e. 
in times of crisis it is the government that will force the central bank to provide liquidity. 
When the sovereign in these countries is threatened, it will prevail over the central bank. 
This is not the case in the eurozone. In the latter, the governments depend on the goodwill of 
the ECB to provide liquidity. They have no power over the ECB and cannot force that 
institution, even in times of crisis, to provide liquidity. Thus, in the eurozone today, there is a 
primacy of the central bank over the sovereigns.  
This is a model that cannot be sustained in democratic societies. The ECB consists of 
unelected officials, while governments are populated by elected officials. It is inconceivable 
that these governments will accept to be pushed into insolvency while unelected officials in 
Frankfurt have the power to prevent this but refuse to use this power. When subjected to a 
true test, such a model of the governance of the eurozone will collapse and rightly so.  
Thus, we arrive at the following conundrum. The role of the ECB as a lender of last resort is 
essential to keep the eurozone afloat. Yet, at the same time, the present governance of this 
crucial lender-of-last-resort function is unsustainable because its use depends on the 
goodwill of the ECB, thereby making the fate of democratically legitimate governments 
dependent on the judgment of unelected officials. In order to sustain this role of the central 
bank as a lender of last resort, it has to be made subordinate to the political power of elected 
officials, as is the case in modern democracies such as the US, Sweden, the UK, etc. This can 
only be achieved by creating a eurozone government that is backed by a European 
Parliament and that has primacy over the central bank. Until then, the eurozone will remain 
a fragile and vulnerable institution, which will be reflected in volatility in the government 
bond markets.  
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Appendix: The econometric model 
In this appendix we describe the econometric model used to separate the effects of 
fundamental variables from the effects of market sentiments. The fundamental variables and 
their expected effects on the spreads are described below:  
 The government debt-to-GDP ratio: when this fundamental increases, the burden of the 
debt service increases, leading to an increasing probability of default. This in turn leads 
to an increase in the spread, which is a risk premium that investors demand to 
compensate them for the increased default risk.2  
 The accumulated current account measures the net foreign debt of the country as a 
whole (private and official residents). It is computed as the current account 
accumulated since 2000 Q1 divided by its GDP level. If the increase in net foreign debt 
arises from the private sector’s overspending, it will lead to default risk of the private 
sector. However, the government is likely to be affected because such defaults lead to a 
negative effect on economic activity, inducing a decline in government revenues and 
an increase in government budget deficits. If the increase in net foreign indebtedness 
arises from government overspending, it directly increases the government’s debt 
service, and thus the default risk.  
 The real effective exchange rate as a measure of competitiveness can be considered as an 
early warning variable indicating that a country that experiences a real appreciation 
will run into problems of competitiveness, which in turn will lead to future current 
account deficits, and future debt problems. Investors may then demand an additional 
risk premium.  
 Economic growth affects the ease with which a government is capable of servicing its 
debt. The lower the growth rate, the more difficult it is to raise tax revenues. As a 
result, a decline of economic growth will increase the incentive of the government to 
default, raising the default risk and the spread. 
We specify the econometric equation in a non-linear form in the debt ratio. The reason comes 
from the fact that every decision to default is a discontinuous one, and leads to high 
potential losses. Thus, as the debt-to-GDP-ratio increases, investors realise that they are 
coming closer to the default decision, making them more sensitive to a given increase in the 
debt-to-GDP ratio (Giavazzi & Pagano, 1996). 
 
                                                     
  
                  (1) 
 
where:  
 Iit is the interest rate spread of country i in period t. 
      is the accumulated current account-to-GDP ratio of country i in period t. 
        is either the government debt-to-GDP ratio or the fiscal space of country i in 
period t. 
       is the real effective exchange rate. 
                                                   
2 We also experimented with the government deficit-to-GDP ratio. But this variable does not have a 
significant effect in any of the regressions we estimated. 
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          is the GDP growth rate. 
   is the constant term. 
    is country i’s fixed effect. This variable measures the idiosyncrasies of a country 
that affect its spread and that are not time dependent. For example, the efficiency of 
the tax system, the quality of the governance, and many other variables that are 
country-specific are captured by the fixed effect.  
    is the time dummy variable. This measures the time effects that are unrelated to 
the fundamentals of the model or (by definition) to the fixed effects. If significant, it 
shows that the spreads move in time unrelated to the fundamental forces driving the 
yields. We interpret this time dummy as reflecting market sentiments that exist at a 
point in time. 
The results of estimating this equation are shown in Table A1. We observe that the debt-to-
GDP ratio has the expected sign and is significant. The same can be said about growth. The 
accumulated current account and the real effective exchange rate have the expected sign but 
are not significant. The time dummies have a jointly significant effect on the spreads.  
 
Table A 1. Estimation results equation (1)  
Debt/GDP ratio (%) -0.1202 *** (0.0304) 
Debt/GDP ratio squared  0.0009 *** (0.0002) 
Accumulated current account/GDP ratio (%) -0.0048         (0.0034) 
Real effective exchange rate  0.0554         (0.0332) 
Growth rate (%) -0.1851 **   (0.0659) 
Country fixed effects  Controlled 
Time fixed effects (quarterly)  Controlled 
Number of observations  560 
Number of countries 10 
R-squared 0.8601 
Notes: Cluster at country level and robust standard error is shown in brackets.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Sample period: (2000Q1-2013Q4). 
